Conduit (Psiphon)

P2P Infrastructure

A volunteer-operated proxy relay application within the Psiphon censorship circumvention network. Volunteers outside censored countries install Conduit on Android, desktop, or server to share bandwidth as proxy nodes. Censored users (primarily in Iran) connect through Psiphon, which routes their traffic through available Conduit nodes via the inproxy protocol, forwarding it to Psiphon's cloud server network and onward to the open internet.

Comunidade

Detalhes

Licença GPLv3 (Psiphon open source; https://github.com/Psiphon-Labs/psiphon-conduit)
Status de Dev 🟢 Ativo
Detalhe do Status de Dev Released (production)
Proprietário Psiphon Inc. (Toronto, Ontario, Canada)
País Canada (Psiphon Inc., Toronto, Ontario)
Ano de Início 2023
Stack React Native / Expo (mobile app); Go (inproxy/psiphon-tunnel-core); Python (tooling)
Financiamento OTF (Open Technology Fund) — $18.54M for 2024; US State Department / USAGM; BBC; private commercial contracts
Última Investigação 9 de mar. de 2026

Domínios de Caso de Uso

Capacidades

Self-hostable

P2P Infrastructure Atributos

Origins Psiphon 1.0 (Citizen Lab, University of Toronto, 2006); Psiphon 1.X volunteer home-based proxy model; inproxy protocol from psiphon-tunnel-core
Database N/A (relay infrastructure; reputation data stored locally for broker matching)
Data Formats Arbitrary (application-agnostic; forwards encrypted Psiphon tunnel traffic)
Mobile Support Yes (Android via Google Play)
Web Support No (no web interface)
Native Apps Yes (Android app; macOS via Catalyst; CLI binary for Linux/macOS/Windows)
Terms Free (volunteer bandwidth donation; no compensation to Conduit operators)
Funds $18.54M+ OTF awards for 2024 (cumulative Psiphon funding from US State Dept, OTF, BBC in hundreds of millions since 2010)
Based On Psiphon 1.X volunteer home-proxy concept; SSH tunneling; VPN/HTTPS/proxy obfuscation stack; inproxy protocol
P2P Architecture Centrally brokered volunteer proxy (inproxy): censored users matched to available Conduit volunteer nodes by Psiphon broker; traffic relayed via encrypted tunnel to Psiphon cloud servers
Overlay Network N/A (traffic forwarded to Psiphon cloud; no content-addressing)
Content Addressing N/A
Local-First N/A (relay only; data passes through, not stored)
E2EE Yes — SSH core tunnel with obfuscation; encrypted between Psiphon client and Psiphon server; Conduit node sees only encrypted proxy traffic
Byzantine Fault Tolerance No
Signature SSH public keys (pre-shared for server authentication); obfuscation keys
Permissions Broker reputation system (nodes build reputation by uptime; broker preferentially routes to established nodes)
Protocol Maturity / Standardization Proprietary Open Standard (Psiphon inproxy protocol is open source but Psiphon-controlled; no formal standards body)
Infrastructure Function Censorship circumvention; Relay / proxy; Bandwidth sharing
Threat Model State-level censorship; DPI (Deep Packet Inspection); ISP-level blocking; IP enumeration blocking
Volunteer / Node Model Volunteer-operated (bandwidth donation); Hybrid (volunteer Conduit nodes + Psiphon commercial cloud servers)
Traffic Visibility No content (encrypted payload only); Partial metadata — Conduit node sees encrypted traffic from matched user; does not see browsing history or content
Active Deployment Scale 200,000+ Conduit stations activated January 2026 (Iran-focused deployment surge); ~3M+ weekly Psiphon users globally